This paper investigates the link between cannabis depenalisation and crime using we use the fact that the declassification changed expected punishments differently in various age groups due to thresholds in British criminal law and employ a differencein-differences type design using data from the longitudinal version of the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey. Our findings suggest essentially no increases in either cannabis consumption, consumption of other drugs, crime and other forms of risky behaviour.
Introduction
The effects of cannabis use on a range of outcomes and whether access to it should be regulated have been discussed heavily in both the public and in academia (see, e.g., Pudney, 2010 , for a recent survey). Evidence from various countries indicates that cannabis consumption (a) may lead to physical and mental health problems, although effects are often not large (van Ours and Williams, 2011; 2012) ; (b) has mixed effects on wages (Kaestner, 1991; Gill and Michaels, 1992; Register and Williams, 1992; Kaestner, 1994; van Ours, 2007) ; (c) has negative, but often weak effects on (un-)employment (e.g., Gill and Michaels, 1992; Register and Williams, 1992; Kaestner, 1994; Burgess and Propper, 1998; Zarkin et al., 1998; MacDonald and Pudney, 2000; French et al., 2001; De Simone, 2002; van Ours, 2006) and (d) is correlated with the use of other, harder drugs, although it is not clear to what extent cannabis causes the consumption of these drugs as predicted by the gateway theory (e.g., van Ours, 2003; Pudney, 2003; Melberg et al., 2010) .
In this paper, we evaluate a depenalisation of cannabis possession and consumption in the UK in 2004. Using individual-level panel data we consider the effects of this depenalisation on crime, consumption of cannabis and other drugs as well as other forms of risky behaviour. A link between cannabis consumption and the consumption of other drugs has long been suspected (the so-called gateway theory), even though causality has been hard to establish (e.g., van Ours, 2003; Pudney, 2003; Melberg et al., 2010) . Furthermore, a link between cannabis consumption and crime can be hypothesized for a range of reasons: (a) consumption of cannabis might have a direct impact on individuals' criminal behaviour (e.g., Adda, McConnel and Rasul, 2011), (b) there might be an increase in property crime if individuals commit crimes to obtain money for buying drugs (e.g., Adda, McConnel and Rasul, 2011) , (c) there might be an increase in violent crimes if drug users are also more likely to sell drugs and engage in turf-wars with other dealers (e.g., Adda, McConnel and Rasul, 2011) , (d) buying drugs might bring drug users into contact with criminals, such as dealers, which might influence criminal behaviour through peer effects (e.g., Pudney, 2003) and finally (e) depenalisation of cannabis might lead rebellious adolescents turn towards other forms of risky behaviour such as low level crime.
Evidence on the relationship between cannabis, crime and other forms of risky behaviour -despite its prominence in society's opinion and the minds of countless worried parents -is relatively sparse. For Britain, Pudney (2003) finds some evidence that early cannabis use can increase minor offending and less clear evidence for a link with serious crime. Adda, McConnel and Rasul (2011) look at the effects of a localized depenalisation of cannabis, leading to an increase in cannabis possession offences and -through a shift in police resources towards non-drug crime -to lower crime rates. Further evidence has linked the uptake of cannabis use to subsequent criminal behaviour in New Zealand (Fergusson and Horwood, 1997) , while there also exists evidence on the link between the size of drug markets and crime rates (Grogger and Willis, 2000; Pacula and Kilmer, 2003) .
The evidence on the link between legalisation or decriminalisation of cannabis and cannabis consumption has recently been summarised by Bretteville-Jensen (2006) , MacCoun (2010) , Pacula (2010) and Pudney (2010) . The available evidence can be broadly grouped into estimates of the reaction of cannabis consumption to changes in the monetary price of the drug and into estimates looking into non-price effects of legalisation (see Pacula, 2010 , for an overview). For the initiation of cannabis consumption (e.g., Pacula et al, 2001; Pacula, Chriqui and King, 2003; DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; Jacobson, 2005; van Ours and Williams, 2007; Bretteville-Jensen and Williams, 2011) as well as consumption changes of regular users (e.g., Nisbet and Vakil, 1972; Williams et al., 2004, Clements and Zhao, 2009 ) the evidence generally indicates that the number of cannabis users reacts to price changes. Participation elasticities in the first case suggest that the number of first time users would increase by around 0% to 7% following a 10% drop in the price of cannabis, while the number of regular users would increase by between 2.4% to 15%. The evidence on decriminalisation (Johnston, et al., 1981; Chaloupka, Grossman and Tauras, 1999; DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001; , changes in enforcement risk (Farrelly et al., 2001; DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; and changes to penalties and fines (Chaloupka, Grossman and Tauras, 1999; Farrelly et al., 2001; Markowitz and Tauras, 2009 ) is very mixed for first time and youth users, but generally indicates that more lenient policing practices and decreases in penalties and fines will increase the number of cannabis users. For regular users, the evidence on enforcement (Pacula,1998; Farrelly et al., 1999) suggest that more lenient enforcement would increase regular use, while the evidence is more mixed and often suggests small or no effects from decriminalisation (Thies and Register, 1993; Pacula, 1998; Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999) or changes to penalties Williams et al., 2004) .
Further -more recent -evidence indicates that Marijuana legalisation may decrease traffic accidents through a reduction in alcohol consumption (Anderson, Hansen and Rees, 2013a) but does not seem to be linked to increased Marijuana consumption among teens (Anderson, Hansen and Rees, 2013b) .
In contrast to most of the previous literature on the link between cannabis consumption and crime, we exploit a natural experiment -the declassification of cannabis from a class B to a class C drug in the UK in 2004 -that led to a large reduction in the potential punishment for cannabis possession. The downgrading moved the maximum penalty for possession from 5 to 2 years of imprisonment and also lowered fines. This depenalisation obviously affects every person residing in the UK, however, the existence of age-related discontinuities in British criminal law means that the reductions in expected punishment differ for individuals in different age brackets: Individuals below 15 years of age can only be sentenced to custodial sentences in a very limited set of circumstances (Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, section 100), while for individuals between 15 and below 18 years of age eventual custodial sentences would be detention and training orders served in a youth offender institution or a secure training centre instead of imprisonment. Individuals above 18 are generally tried according to adult law, but individuals between 18 and below 21 years of age would generally be detained in a young offenders institution (Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, sections 96 to 98), which are similar to adult prisons but tend to have somewhat better conditions than regular jails and a stronger focus on education and training. These age-related discontinuities imply that, say, an 18-year old thinking about taking cannabis experiences a larger reduction in expected punishment through the 2004-declassification than a 15-year old who experiences a larger reduction than a 14-year old as the latter could not have been sentenced to a custodial sentence anyway. This setup leads to an evaluation design that is quite similar to the one used in evaluations of the Federal minimum wage in the US (e.g., Card, 1992) , where everyone is treated after a certain point in time, but the "bite" of the treatment is different between affected units. Evidence on criminal behaviour around these thresholds, in particular at the age of criminal majority, suggest that individuals are generally aware of them, even though they might miscalculate the actual change in expected punishment (Hjalmarsson, 2009) , and change criminal behaviour accordingly (Levitt, 1998; Hjalmarsson, 2009; Lee and McCrary, 2009; Braakmann, 2013) . There is also a large and well-established literature in the economics of crime that suggests that individuals in general react to changes in expected punishments (see Freeman, 1999, and Klick and Tabarrok, 2012 , for surveys).
Our estimation strategy exploits these differences in the changes in expected punishment in a difference-in-differences-type evaluation design where we compare changes in the consumption of cannabis and other drugs and changes in criminal and other risky behaviour pre and post declassification between individuals aged 10 to 14, 15 to 17, 18 to 21 and above 21. This design implies that we essentially look at changes in penalties and changes to police practices to the extent that the latter vary according to age as changes to prices and (general) police practice are more likely to affect every individual in our sample in a similar way. Our findings imply no consistent pattern of changes in either cannabis consumption or other risky behaviour.
These results are broadly consistent with the existing literature on the effects of decriminalization or changes to penalties. To fix thoughts consider a standard Becker model of illegal behaviour (Becker, 1968; Freeman, 1999) applied to cannabis consumption. Individuals weight the expected utility of not consuming cannabis (the legal alternative, U NC ) with the utility of taking cannabis (U C ) while taking into account the risk of being caught by the police (occurring with probability p) and the disutility of punishment (U[S]), where S denotes the severity of punishment. An individual will take cannabis if
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i.e., if the utility of taking cannabis (taking into account the risk of punishment) exceed the utility of not taking cannabis. Depenalisation can affect consumption through two channels: (a) The detection probability p can change if police priorities change and (b) the severity of punishment will change.
Evidence from sentencing statistics is only available for a few years, but to give an the vast majority of custodial sentences for cannabis possession are very short, i.e., below 1.5 months, which suggests that the main effect of the declassification will be around the type of sentence and not the length of an eventual custodial sentence.
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.)
It is also possible that the declassification changes police practice. For example, if the police do not agree with the lower penalties, they could potentially try to increase arrest probabilities to reach the same level of deterrence as before the declassification. As outlined in the introduction, the declassification affects principally every individual living in the UK. However, the changes in the expected severity of punishment differ in two dimensions between individuals of different age. The first dimension is the risk of being convicted to a custodial sentence, the second is the unpleasantness associated with this custodial sentence that will differ according to the institution where the custodial sentence needs to be served (Katz et al., 2003 , use a similar idea, i.e., that the conditions encountered during imprisonment can lead to variation in expected punishment and thus deterrence.): individuals and 10,156 person-year observations. As there is a potential concern with selective attrition, we also estimated all regressions using the four cross-sectional datasets of the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey as well as an unbalanced panel.
The results were qualitatively identical.
Cannabis consumption is measured by a dummy variable that is "1" if the individual reports to have consumed any cannabis in the previous year. As outcomes we consider the consumption of a range of drugs, in particular, heroin, cocaine, crack, amphetamines, ecstasy, acid, amyl nitrites and glue, as well as a summary measure for the consumption of any class A drug. These are all measured by dummy variables that are "1" if an individual took the respective drug at least once per year. In terms of crime, we look at a range of dummy variables that are "1" if an individual reports to have committed a certain type of crime in the respective year. We look at general crime as well as violent and property crime and also consider various subcategories.
Finally, we also have data on a range of low-level criminal activities that can be classified as anti-social behaviour, as well as information on victimization. All of these variables are self-reported, which might lead to measurement error problems discussed in the next subsection. However, the crime and drug use data was collected using computer assisted self-completion to minimise individuals over-or understating their criminal behaviour. Similarly the base effect of is not identified due to the year dummies. The effect of their interaction, however, is identified from the data. Note that individuals can change the treatment group they are in if they cross one of the age thresholds.
This, however, is what we want as their expected punishment and hence their incentives to consume cannabis would change at the same time.
Note that this design implies that we identify using the differential impact the declassification had on the four age groups. Changes to general police practices or the price of cannabis after the declassification cannot be detected with this design. As such our estimates are closer to studies looking into changes to penalties and police enforcement than to studies incorporating price effects.
A concern with the presence of the individual fixed effects is a possible exacerbation of measurement error resulting in attenuation bias towards zero. This problem would be more severe if there was comparatively little variation in cannabis consumption (or other variables of interest) within individuals over years. Pooled over all years, 3% of the under 15-year-olds, 22% of the 15 to 17-year-olds, 29% of the 18 to 20-year-olds and 21% of the over-21-year-olds consumed cannabis.
We also looked at the percentage of variation in cannabis consumption that is explained by the fixed effects, year dummies and age alone. For both annual and monthly consumption these factors explain approximately 50% of the total variation, i.e., there is sufficient variation left that could be influenced by the policy.
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.)
As an additional robustness check we also re-estimate equation (2) as a pooled OLS model without fixed effects. The fixed effects in principle control for potential composition bias in the various treatment groups, however, as the treatment groups are defined by a exogenous variable (age) crossing a threshold we would expect the impact of composition bias to be relatively minor anyway.
Note that is usually a dummy, which means that equation (2) is a linear probability model. This fact, however, is not particularly problematic in this case as equation (2) is close to a saturated regression models as all right-hand side variables in our preferred specification are dummy variables. This fact attenuates concerns regarding the linearity assumption typically leading to differences between linear probability models and non-linear models such as Probit (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009 , ch. 5.2.1).
It is important to stress that the fact that the declassification was not surprising but was announced and widely discussed prior to 2004 is not a threat to identification in equation (2): The idea underlying our approach is that individuals will react to the change in punishment which came into effect in 2004, not to the earlier
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announcement that punishment will change in 2004. This idea seems relatively plausible as long as individuals are deterred from consumption by the higher punishment under the old regime. A potential violation could arise because of misinformation or the belief that courts would treat consumers more leniently in advance of the declassification. However, this possibility seems relatively far fetched.
Furthermore, the fact that there are strong age effects in most outcomes (see Figure 2 for cannabis consumption -other outcomes also show strong age effects) is not problematic due to inclusion of the age dummies. A potential threat to identification would be other events that would operate along the same age group margin as the cannabis declassification, in particular other changes to criminal law that would lead to similar changes in expected punishment. Fortunately, there were no such changes during the observation period.
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.)
Due to the lack of a long time series pre-treatment it is difficult to test the validity of the common trend assumption across the four groups from the micro data used here. Office (Home Office, 2012). Unfortunately, the data does not contain any information for individuals below 16 and the age groups are slightly different from the ones used in this paper. Keeping these problems in mind, the aggregate data at least does not show vastly different trends among the different age groups, which is reassuring.
(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.)
Finally, we employ a basic placebo test where we estimate equation (2) figure 4 , which plots the change in the proportion of individual who report to have taken cannabis at least once a year pre and post declassification. The figure suggests that -while changes in consumption vary considerably with agethere is no clear pattern across age groups more or less affected by the declassification.
Results
Consider first
(FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.)
The estimates in where we also did not observe an increase in consumption. However, some of the point estimates are fairly large and are just rendered insignificant by large standard errors. For the 15 to 17-age group, where we also observed an increase in cannabis consumption, the fixed effects estimates suggest an increase in the likelihood of having committed a property offence by 5% to 7%, depending on whether minor theft is included. There are no increases in violent crime in any of the groups following the declassification. Interestingly, however, there appears to be an increase in the production of drugs for individuals older than 21. In principle, this could be a consequence of the declassification, either because of an increase in demand or because individuals misinterpret the fact that production penalties have not changed.
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.)
We also considered more disaggregated crime categories,. Detailed results are available on request, but broadly spoken, the estimates suggest that the increases in property crime observed for the 15 to 17 year-olds are driven by increases in criminal damage and other theft, i.e., relatively low-level crimes relative to other property crime such as robbery and burglary. Impacts on other types of crime are usually small and often insignificant. Overall, the results do not strongly suggest that the cannabis declassification led to an increase in crime rates: Most of the results are small and insignificant, and, more importantly, there is no consistent picture over treatment groups or estimation methods and the few significant effects that are found might be very well due to chance.
We also considered a possible effect on risky behaviour in general as well as going out and drinking. For the latter Anderson, Hansen and Rees (2013a) found some evidence that alcohol and cannabis are substitutes in the US. Detailed results are again available on request, but the esatimates suggest that risky behaviour, such as graffiti spraying, being unruly and noisy, the carrying of weapons and victimization, did not increase after the declassification. If anything, the estimates suggest substantial reductions in racially motivated attacks and victimization risks among 15 to 17 yearolds, while there are essentially no impacts in any of the other groups. For going out and drinking, our results suggest no consistent pattern of changes to either clubbing, visiting pubs or drinking. If anything, moderate drinking seems to have increased in some age groups, while heavy drunkenness remained essentially unchanged.
The overall picture that emerges from these estimates suggests that following the declassification there do not appear to have been any increases in cannabis consumption in the groups that should have benefitted more from the declassification.
There appears to have been a slight increase in occasional (but not regular) cannabis consumption among 15 to 17 year-olds, although this result might very well be due to chance. In the same group there has also been an increase in property crimes, driven by relatively low-level offences such as criminal damage and other theft. There does not appear to have been an increase in violent crime, drug crime or more serious property crime in any of the groups. Among 15 to 17 year-olds there also appears to have been a drop in victimization risks. Some of these results, however, depend on whether individual fixed effects are included. Overall, the estimates certainly do not suggest that individuals react very strongly to reductions in penalties associated with cannabis consumption, neither in terms of drug consumption nor in terms of other forms of criminal or risky behaviour. It is important, however, to be clear that our estimates cannot detect consumption changes caused by changes to the price of cannabis. The previous literature has regularly found strong demand reactions to these and prices might well have changed in response to the declassification. Our paper is closer to the part of the literature looking at changes to penalties, police enforcement or decriminalisation more generally. Our findings are also broadly in line with this literature in the sense of not finding very much evidence that decriminalisation of cannabis leads to large increases in consumption.
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